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Abstract 
Russian CEOs are arguably the most experienced managers in the world when it 
comes to working in corrupt environments. For our analysis, we gathered data from 
the CEOs and owners of 111 local and international companies operating in Russia. 
We asked them to assess their experiences with informal practices, including the 
extent to which their businesses are dependent on informal deals and the strategies 
they deploy to mitigate business corruption. The list of specific practices and 
strategies assembled in the pilot interviews and media content analysis has been 
cross-checked with the existing typologies of corruption in post-communist 
societies and verified through in-depth interviews.  
This study presents the outcomes of our analysis, one of which is that companies 
tend to blame officials for corrupt activities while hiding their own internal 
corruption from public view. Both are dependent on the industry in which they 
operate, however. The paper also includes the approach we developed to 
understand the less reprehensible but more widespread forms of corruption such 
as collusion, conflict of interest, cronyism and nepotism, fraud, gifts and 
hospitality, lobbying, abuse of power or office, and influence peddling. 
 
Note: The original version of this article appeared as Stanislav Shekshnia, Alena 
Ledeneva and Elena Denisova-Schmidt, “Reflective Leadership vs. Endemic 
Corruption: Managing Corruption in Emerging Markets,” INSEAD Working Paper 
No. 2013/121/EFE (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373889, but has been 
significantly reworked with reference to inner-company corruption. 
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Introduction  
Corruption remains one of the main challenges in doing business in many 
countries.1 Analyzing this phenomenon from many different perspectives—
economic, managerial, sociological, psychological, anthropological and 
institutional—scholars and practitioners have underlined its negative impact.2 The 
increase in expertise on this topic, together with the longstanding efforts by such 
international agencies as the IMF and the World Bank as well as national 
governments, has not led to any effective control of business corruption, however, 
especially in fast-growing economies like China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and 
Russia.3 Examining current initiatives companies have undertaken to manage the 
risk of corruption, PricewaterhouseCoopers found that only 22% of firms are 
confident of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs they already have.4 
Our paper introduces special tools for monitoring corruption when doing business 
in Russia—tools that might also be applicable for other emerging markets. Russia 
is an interesting case. Not only is it the second-largest emerging economy in the 
                                                   
1 See Raymond Fisman and Jakob Svensson, “Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm 
Level Evidence,” Journal of Development Economics 83.1 (2007): 63-75; Roberto Martin N. Galang, “Victim or 
Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption,” Journal of Management Studies 49.2 (2012): 429-462; 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using 
Alternative Institutional Indicators,” Economics and Politics 7.3 (1995): 207-228; Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and 
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110.3 (1995): 681-712; Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 
“Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108.3 (1993): 599-617; Steven Globerman and Daniel Shapiro, 
“Governance Infrastructure and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Business Studies 34.1 
(2003): 19-39; and Kathleen A. Getz and Roger J. Volkema, “Culture, Perceived Corruption and Economics: A 
Model of Predictors and Outcomes,” Business Society 40.1 (2001): 7-30. 
2 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (Academic Press, 1978); Douglass C. North 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Oliver E. 
Williamson, “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 36.2 (1991): 269-296; Bryan W. Husted, “Wealth, Culture, and Corruption,” 
Journal of International Business Studies 30.2 (1999): 339-359; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around the World,” Journal of Finance 54.2 (1999): 471-517; Jong-Sung 
You and Sanjeev Khagram, “A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption,” American Sociological Review 
70.1 (2005): 136-157; Lawrence Lessig, “Institutional Corruptions,” Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working 
Papers, No. 1, March 15, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233582; and Dennis 
Thompson, “Two Concepts of Corruption,” Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 16, August 1, 
2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304419. 
3 See indexes for all countries at http://www.heritage.org/index/country/russia. 
4 The PricewaterhouseCoopers Report, “Confronting Corruption: The Business Case for an Effective Anti-
Corruption Programme,” is available online at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/forensic-accounting-dispute-
consulting-services/business-case-anti-corruption-programme.jhtml. The report is based on a survey of 390 
senior executives, supplemented with in-depth interviews with 36 senior executives and experts in anti-
corruption efforts from 14 countries. It examines the current and possible future actions companies perform 
to manage the risk of corruption. 
EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • HOW TO MITIGATE CORRUPTION IN EMERGING 
MARKETS: THE CASE OF RUSSIA • SHEKSHNIA, LEDENEVA, DENISOVA-SCHMIDT • FEBRUARY 6, 2014  
5 
world after China, it is also labeled as one of the most corrupt countries.5 In recent 
years, the Russian government has undertaken significant anti-corruption efforts in 
line with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and World Bank policy recommendations, but the results 
of such efforts at company level are far from encouraging.  
Business Corruption in Russia 
Although the theme of business corruption in Russia has been widely researched in 
a comparative context (BEEPS),6 research has mainly focused on general 
perceptions of corruption and specific forms of corruption such as bribe-taking, 
which can be measured. In 2010, Russia ranked at the bottom of 22 countries 
assessed in Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index. However, little is 
known about other forms of corporate corruption, such as collusion, conflicts of 
interest, cronyism and nepotism, fraud, gifts and hospitality, lobbying, and 
influence-peddling which are arguably more widespread.  
Such an incomplete picture offers fertile ground for the emergence of popular 
perceptions of the origins and nature of business corruption in Russia, the most 
popular being that corrupt government officials at all levels extort rents from 
innocent businesses, which suffer from bureaucratic red-tape and are forced to 
engage in shadowy practices. 
In [my] region, according to an agreement with the unions, the monthly 
recommended minimum wage is about USD 180. Both the regional pension 
fund and the regional administration put pressure on businesses to pay at 
least that. So that’s what I do, I pay my employees USD 180 minimal wage. 
Officially. The rest they get in the envelopes. I do it because if I showed the 
real wage, about USD 750, 13% must be paid in personal tax by employee, 
another 24% goes for social tax and other payments—roughly, one third has 
                                                   
5 Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index measures the perception of corporate corruption, rather 
than the perception of public sector corruption reflected in the aggregate Corruption Perception Index, where 
in 2013 Russia placed at 127 out of 177 countries.  
6 The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a joint initiative of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The survey focusses on firms in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, assessing business development and environment. See more at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.  
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to go to the state. Moreover, I have to pay office rent, depreciation, 
accessories’ cost, electricity bills, Internet bills, etc., so in the end I work with 
losses. The laws are made so that you have to pay one third just for doing 
business . . . they [the state] provoke the entrepreneur in some way to make 
shadow business, not showing all of the income and expenses, making a 
secret of commerce. 
To shed some light on business corruption in Russia, its scope and impact on 
business, and to understand how business leaders perceive corruption and seek to 
mitigate its impact, we conducted a survey of business leaders and complemented 
it with in-depth interviews and executive workshops to frame the outcomes of the 
survey. We devised an approach based on “slicing” corruption into constituent 
informal practices, and collected data on 111 companies, which allowed us to gain 
insights into the workings of firms in endemically corrupt environments. We 
consider the results of this survey worth sharing. 
Empirical Data 
The proposed approach allowed us to monitor the occurrence of informal practices 
in daily business operations, to assess the extent to which informal practices 
prevail in corporate settings, and to identify blind spots which are not addressed by 
existing anti-corruption strategies at company level. Informal practices are best 
defined as regular sets of strategies used by actors for getting things done while 
navigating multiple sets of rules and constraints, both formal and informal, legal 
and ethical, written and unwritten.7 Informal practices adjust to changing legal 
frameworks and social norms, and evolve to reflect changes in the rules of the 
game.8 The data can improve the robustness of the corresponding anti-corruption 
strategies. We devised a questionnaire for CEOs, owners, and board members that 
                                                   
7 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business 
(Cornell University Press, 2006).  
8 Alena Ledeneva and Stanislav Shekshnia, “Doing Business in Russia: Informal Practices and Anti-Corruption 
Strategies,” Russie.Nei.Visions 58 (2011), http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-
detail&id=6474&id_provenance=97&lang=uk, accessed November 12, 2013, and Elena Denisova-Schmidt, 
“Corruption and Informal Practices in Russia,” Euxeinos: Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture 
in Europe 7 (2012): 3-19, http://www.gce.unisg.ch/de/Euxeinos, accessed November 12, 2013.  
EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • HOW TO MITIGATE CORRUPTION IN EMERGING 
MARKETS: THE CASE OF RUSSIA • SHEKSHNIA, LEDENEVA, DENISOVA-SCHMIDT • FEBRUARY 6, 2014  
7 
included a list of informal practices defined on the basis of the multi-stage process 
outlined below.  
At the exploratory stage, we examined existing typologies of corruption and 
conducted a content analysis of the Russian business media in order to identify 
corrupt practices that correspond to these types. We conducted interviews with 
Russian CEOs and directors who were asked to comment on their familiarity with 
each practice, as well as its frequency. While such practices may not be perceived 
as corrupt by their protagonists, they nourish the corrupt environment indirectly. 
For example, one of the executives surveyed, who runs a transportation company, 
explained that the firm’s service centers routinely offer repair and car-wash free of 
charge for the traffic police because “they have such a small budget for repairing 
their police cars.” 
The list of specific practices, assembled in pilot interviews and content-analysis of 
the media, was cross-checked with and adapted from existing typologies of 
corruption in post-communist societies9 and informal practices.10,11  
In our test survey, we reserved a space for respondents to add to our list of 
informal practices. Only two practices were added. In addition to the obvious 
                                                   
9 Vito Tanzi, “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,” IMF Staff Papers 45.4 
(1998): 559-594; Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies (M. E. 
Sharpe, 2005); and Stephen Knack, “Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of 
Cross-Country Indicators,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3936 (2006).  
10 Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works; Alena Ledeneva, “From Russia with Blat: Can Informal Networks Help 
Modernize Russia?” Social Research 76.1 (2009): 257-288; and Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? 
Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
11 Types are observed and articulated with reference to degree (petty, administrative, state capture); 
frequency (routine or extraordinary, exercised by many or by few); motivation (coercive or collusive); level 
(centralized or decentralized); or scale (predictable or arbitrary). All of these are variations on the theme of 
deviance and are described in terms that are unlikely to be used by participants in corrupt practices. See 
Michael Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” Comparative Politics 18.4 
(1986): 459-477; Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Tanzi, “Corruption Around the World”; and Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do 
It.  
In a 2006 World Bank paper, which adopts the Transparency International definition of corruption as “the 
misuse of entrusted power for private gain,” economist Stephen Knack (2006) organizes these variations into 
six dimensions of corruption: by level of political system (central government, provincial, municipal), roughly 
corresponding to the terms “petty” and “grand” corruption; by purpose of the improper actions, to influence 
the content of laws and rules (“state capture”) or to influence their implementation (“administrative 
corruption”); by the actors involved in the corrupt transaction—various combinations of firms, households and 
public officials; by characteristics of a particular set of actors, for example, bribes required for large versus 
small firms, or for rich versus poor households; by administrative agency or service—tax and customs, 
business licenses, inspections, utility connections, courts or public education and health facilities; and by the 
incidence or magnitude of bribes or by the uncertainty they create for businesses and households. Knack, 
“Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.” 
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reasons why open choice prompts in survey questions remain unanswered,12 the 
low number of additions could be interpreted as support for the sufficiency of the 
existing list, or for the unarticulated nature of informal practices for those who use 
them routinely.  
In the introduction to the survey, we used the term “informal practices” to refer to 
sets of strategies commonly used by actors to get things done. We asked the 
participants to report anonymously to what extent their firm engaged in each 
practice and strategy, choosing from three possible answers: systematically, 
sometimes, never. Anonymity was emphasized and preserved, even where it 
created limitations to our analysis. 
As illustrated in Figures 1a, 1b and 1c, a broad range of companies (by size, 
industry, and ownership structure) was represented in the sample.  
  
Figure 1a: Size acceding to the number of employees 
 
 
                                                   
12 Robert M. Groves, Don A. Dillman, John L. Eltinge, and Roderick J. A. Little, eds., Survey Nonresponse (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2001).  
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Figure 1b: Size according to industry  
 
 
Figure 1c: Ownership Structure 
Frequency of Informal Practices: An Indicator of a 
Systemic Problem or a Key for Prioritization? 
The most basic, but also the most interesting, result is the relative frequency of 
informal practices, summarized below in Table 1. 
  
4% 
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6% 
12% 
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23% 
22% 
no response 
extractive industry 
energy, oil & gas 
manufacturing  
telecom. & IT 
financial services 
retail 
services 
other 
4.55% 
11.82% 
8.18% 
4.55% 
1.82% 
5.45% 
63.64% 
no response 
foreign company  
joint venture 
public company 
government-controlled public company  
state-owned company  
private company  
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Practice systematically sometimes never 
Funding of publications in regional press and broadcasts 
on regional TV and radio 
19 61 27 
Disregarding “conflict of interest” of regional managers, 
e.g. their use of companies affiliated with them, 
recruitment of relatives, etc.  
13 67 26 
Selecting vendors/contractors with whom regional 
managers have informal relationships or arrangements 
13 66 28 
Extortion of bribes by regional regulatory agencies: tax 
inspectorate, sanitation service, police, etc. 
25 51 28 
Receipt of kickbacks or other informal rewards (e.g. 
expensive gifts) by regional managers from vendors, 
suppliers and buyers 
5 65 36 
Paying for the services of regional regulatory agencies: 
tax inspectorate, customs, sanitation service, police, fire 
inspectorate, standardization agencies, etc. 
29 39 36 
Using company staff to carry out personal assignments 
for regional managers (assistance to family members, 
construction and decoration of housing, organization of 
holidays and entertainment) 
6 61 41 
Using informal connections and networks to obtain state 
orders (state procurement) and loans from state banks 
11 49 44 
Use of the “telephone rule”—informal pressure on 
regional managers and verbal instructions—by 
representatives of federal and regional authorities 
7 50 48 
Regional authorities’ pressure on the company’s regional 
managers to provide funding for their regional programs 
and projects 
13 39 53 
Selecting winners of open tenders at the regional level on 
the basis of informal relationships and arrangements 
10 42 55 
Paying salaries and bonuses to staff of regional 
subdivisions in cash without paying social tax 
22 29 59 
Use of company funds by heads of regional subdivisions 
to buy expensive cars, telephones, to pay for travel, etc. 
5 45 60 
Paying for or providing services (foreign trips, medical 
expenses, etc.) to regional executive authorities 
9 34 64 
Creating informal alliances with other companies in the 
region to exert influence on regional authorities 
2 33 70 
Receiving subsidies and tax benefits from regional 
authorities 
8 26 71 
Paying exorbitant board of directors’ fees to cronies 3 30 75 
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Paying for or providing services (foreign trips, medical 
expenses, etc.) to regional legislative authorities 
6 26 74 
Extortion of bribes by regional authorities 10 23 73 
Using informal tools (compromising documents and 
information, material from security services and 
krugovaya poruka13) against competitors 
7 25 73 
Paying police and the prosecution service to open or 
close criminal cases 
8 22 75 
Using informal tools (compromising documents and 
information, material from security services and 
krugovaya poruka) to manage company staff   
3 28 74 
Paying for favorable court rulings by the regional courts 10 19 75 
Paying for tax audits and other inspections in regional 
subdivisions with pre-agreed results 
4 20 82 
Using informal tools (compromising documents and 
information, material from security services and 
krugovaya poruka) to exert pressure on regional authorities 
6 9 87 
Lease of the company’s production, office premises or 
production equipment by regional managers for personal 
gain 
1 12 96 
Receipt of commissions or other material benefits from 
job candidates by heads of regional subdivisions 
3 3 99 
Table 1: Most Frequently Used Informal Practices  
(number of companies, in descending order by “not never” responses) 
Needless to say, the priorities that can be determined on the basis of systemically 
used practices in a cross-company survey and an inner-company survey may differ 
significantly. We conducted two inner-company test surveys, one in the energy 
sector and one in the financial one. 
The variation in the use of informal practices between companies can be 
substantial. For example, see the comparison of the prevalence of paying salaries 
and bonuses in envelopes (that is, in cash) between the cross-company and inner-
company surveys in the energy sector data (Figure 2). 
                                                   
13 Joint responsibility or mutual concealment; Seilschaften in German.    
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Figure 2: Prevalence of the practice of paying salaries and bonuses to staff in cash  
Whereas this energy company seems to be ahead in its compliance with the social 
tax, it appears to lag behind when it comes to selecting the winners of open tenders 
on the basis of informal relationships and agreements (see Figure 3). 
    
Figure 3: Prevalence of the practice of selecting winners of open tenders on the  
basis of informal relationships and agreements  
Predictably, as a large company in the energy sector, it suffers more pressure from 
regional governments to finance their pet projects and programs (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Pressure from regional governments to finance their pet projects and programs 
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Such detailed inner-company data on the complete spectrum of informal practices 
would be of interest to the company’s managers.  
Overall, the findings suggest that the level of penetration of informal practices is 
sufficiently high to claim that such practices are fairly ubiquitous in the daily 
operations of Russian businesses. It is important, however, to assess the systemic 
nature of these practices. We experimented with a number of weighting schemes 
for systemically used practices, and determined just how different the top ten 
practices would be if we focused on these systemically used practices. We 
evaluated the relative importance of each practice by weighting respondents’ 
answers using the following scale: 0 points for “never,” 2 points for “sometimes,” 
and 5 points for “systematically.” Weighting is essential to identify the most 
systematically occurring problems for the purposes of inner-company management. 
The most systematically used practice scored 278 points (the average score was 
156), while the least used practice acquired as little as 24 points (see Table 2). 
Practices scoring the highest number of points are excellent pointers for the 
required change, whereas the lowest scoring practices are a good proxy for a 
change that has already has taken place.14  
  
                                                   
14 We include the least systematically used informal practices in order to illustrate changes that have 
happened since the transitional period in Russia in the 1990s. Practices listed at the bottom of the table 
scored high in the content analysis of the media and are still occasionally used, but they have lost their 
systemic nature and now serve as the best indicators of the effectiveness of the reforms conducted in their 
respective areas.  
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Practice Weight Points 
Extortion of bribes by regional regulatory agencies: tax 
inspectorate, sanitation service, police, etc. 
6.60% 278 
Funding of publications in regional press and broadcasts on 
regional TV and radio 
6.60% 278 
Disregarding “conflict of interest” of regional managers, e.g. their 
use of companies affiliated with them, recruitment of relatives, etc.  
6.32% 266 
Selecting vendors/contractors with whom regional managers have 
informal relationships or arrangements 
6.24% 263 
Paying for the services of regional regulatory agencies: tax 
inspectorate, customs, sanitation service, police, fire inspectorate, 
standardization agencies, etc. 
6.22% 262 
Receipt of kickbacks or other informal rewards (e.g. expensive 
gifts) by regional managers from vendors, suppliers and buyers 
5.22% 220 
Using company staff to carry out personal assignments for 
regional managers (assistance to family members, construction 
and decoration of housing, organization of holidays and 
entertainment) 
5.06% 213 
Using informal connections and networks to obtain state orders 
(state procurement) and loans from state banks 
4.80% 202 
Paying salaries and bonuses to staff of regional subdivisions in 
cash without paying social tax 
4.68% 197 
Using informal tools (compromising documents and information, 
material from security services and krugovaya poruka) to manage 
company staff   
2.35% 99 
Paying for tax audits and other inspections in regional subdivisions 
with pre-agreed results 
1.90% 80 
Using informal tools (compromising documents and information, 
material from security services and krugovaya poruka) to exert 
pressure on regional authorities 
1.35% 57 
Lease of the company’s production or office premises or 
production equipment by regional managers for personal gain 
0.97% 41 
Receipt of commissions or other material benefits from job 
candidates by heads of regional subdivisions 
0.57% 24 
Total 100% 4212 
Table 2: The most and the least systematically used informal practices  
(in the descending order by weighted points) 
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Corruption Mitigation: Business Executives’ 
Perspective 
To complement the quantitative survey, we conducted 20 in-depth interviews with 
the CEOs participating in the study and four executive workshops with senior 
managers from three companies in the survey. These conversations helped us to 
identify four typical positions that executives take up in relation to corruption.  
The first—toleration—is the most widespread among interviewees: “Because the 
whole society is corrupt, and unless systemic changes occur, corruption cannot be 
effectively dealt with and is widely accepted. It is not up to us to promote anti-
corruption changes; the government should take care of it.”  
The second approach—exploitation—is expressed openly only by a small minority: 
“Since Russian society is deeply corrupt, corruption should not only be accepted 
but also proactively used to advance business interests.” In other words, the 
endemic nature of corruption makes it a legitimate instrument for doing business.  
The third—avoidance—is also articulated by a small minority: “Even in an 
endemically corrupt environment, where corruption is generally accepted, it is 
possible to avoid it and to run a business without it playing a role. Others may 
suffer from corruption but we can find a way to stay away from it.”  
The fourth—management of corruption—is shared by a select few: “Corruption is a 
problem and we are working on it, even where we are unable to change the 
environment.”  
These executives recognize corruption as a major risk and develop specific 
strategies and mechanisms to mitigate it. The four positions articulated above can 
be organized into a matrix demonstrating that the majority of executives are not 
prepared for a full-scale fight against corruption (the percentages were estimated 
by the interviewers). A range of psychological and technical factors prevent them 
from taking up the anti-corruption challenge. 
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Attitudes to corruption Passive attitude Active attitude 
Acceptance of corruption as a real risk  
to business   
Toleration (60%) Management (15%) 
Non-acceptance of corruption as a real 
risk to business 
Avoidance (15%) Exploitation (10%) 
Table 3: Executives’ attitudes to corruption 
Failure to recognize corruption as a threat to their business (often at a 
subconscious level) or rationalization of a personal inability to deal with it 
effectively relieves executives of the additional responsibility of managing 
corruption at their level.15 Limited usefulness of top-down, government-driven 
approaches to corruption management, as well as a lack of knowledge of 
alternative company-specific methods, reduces executives’ capacity to manage 
corruption effectively. Corporations tend to blame corruption in the public sector 
and hide internal corruption from the public, while the most important aspect of 
corruption—the interaction between the state and the firm—remains 
unscrutinised.16  
To overcome this situation, corporate executives have to adopt what we call 
“reflective leadership.” Reflective leaders see corporate responsibility as inclusive 
of the courage to confront external corruption proactively and of the will to enforce 
anti-corruption instruments to deal with the firm’s internal corruption. As we have 
shown in this section, this is a particularly challenging task in emerging markets 
which are often ridden with endemic corruption. 
Managing Corruption: Reflective Leadership, Top-
Down and Bottom-Up Approaches 
There are two distinct theoretical approaches to corruption management at 
company level. The first, the so-called top-down, prescriptive approach, is 
                                                   
15 Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth and Mahendra Joshi, “Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation 
of Corruption in Organizations,” Academy of Management Executive 19.4 (2005): 9-23; Peter Fleming and 
Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos, Charting Corporate Corruption: Agency, Structure and Escalation (Edward Elgar, 2009). 
16 The question of how to mitigate corruption when dealing with public officials is discussed in Shekshnia, 
Ledeneva and Denisova-Schmidt, “Reflective Leadership vs. Endemic Corruption.” 
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advocated by international organizations such as the UN and the OECD and is 
supported by most national government signatories to their Anti-Corruption and 
Anti-Bribery Conventions.17 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) such as 
Transparency International also call upon firms to fight bribery both at the macro 
and at the individual company level and to promote business principles for 
countering bribery and codes of corporate conduct. These international 
organizations supply management policies and toolkits, information sessions, 
internal audits and guidelines, irrespective of the specific characteristics of the firm 
or the context in which it operates.18 For example, based on the findings of a survey 
conducted at 100 enterprises in 16 emerging markets, Transparency International 
recommends19 that companies become more publicly accountable: to be more 
transparent to their stakeholders; to make their anti-corruption programs publicly 
available; to publish exhaustive lists of their subsidiaries, affiliates, and joint 
ventures; and to disclose other information related to their operations.   
The second approach, the bottom-up approach, is company-centered and grounded 
in management and social theories that focus on corruption mitigation within a 
complex social context, inclusive of such contingencies as the individual, the 
organization, or its business environment, as well as social and cultural contexts.20 
Having reviewed the management literature on government corruption, Galang 
argues that a firm’s behavior in a corrupt environment is determined by two 
factors: the firm’s political resources and the dependence of the industry in which 
the firm operates on government regulations. Factors such as a country’s 
institutional development, and the corporate culture and structure of the firm also 
                                                   
17 See the leading national legislations such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the FCPA) (1977), the 
U.K. Anti-Corruption Act (2010), and the UN and OECD conventions: United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/, and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34859_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
18 See Transparency International, “Business Principles for Countering Bribery,” December 17, 2013, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/business_principles_for_countering_bribery. 
19 Transparency International, “Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing Emerging Market 
Multinationals,” October 16, 2013, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/transparency_in_corporate_reporting_assessing_emerging_mark
et_multinational.  
20 Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, Charting Corporate Corruption and Galang, “Victim or Victimizer.” 
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play a part.21 Galang identifies four distinct strategic approaches to government 
corruption: 
The Altering strategy (high regulatory dependence/high level of political resources), 
which leads to engagement with the government, institutional change and 
regulatory capture; this strategy benefits both the firm and the economy.  
The Avoidance strategy (low regulatory dependence/high level of political 
resources), which leads to self-restraint, non-investment, and formation of business 
groups; this strategy benefits the firm.  
The Alliance strategy (high regulatory dependence/low level of political resources), 
which leads to networking and forming joint ventures; this strategy benefits both 
the firm and the economy.  
The Accedence strategy (low regulatory dependence/low level of political 
resources), which leads to acceptance of the rules of the game proposed by 
government officials and bribing; this strategy benefits both the firm and the 
economy.  
In his theoretical attempt to organize existing internal corruption mitigation 
mechanisms, Lange identifies four types (functions) of corruption controls by 
organizations: 1) autonomy reduction (AR); 2) consequence systems (CS), ensuring 
reward and punishment); 3) environmental sanctioning, “in which an organization 
interprets and transmits to the member external pressures for legal/regulatory 
compliance and social conformity” (ES); and 4) “intrinsically oriented controls, in 
which the organization fosters and facilitates the member’s own inclinations to 
reject corrupt behavior” (IC).22 Other scholars suggest that rationalization at 
individual and organizational levels are important obstacles to effective prevention 
of corruption. They call for the instigation of organizational mechanisms and values 
which prompt corruption to be recognized as a “form of unaccepted deviance,”23 
which could be achieved through training and discussions24 or by better controls 
                                                   
21 Ibid. 
22 Donald Lange, “A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Organizational Corruption Control,” Academy of 
Management Review 33.3 (2008): 710-729. 
23 Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, Charting Corporate Corruption, 134. 
24 Anand, Ashforth and Joshi, “Business as Usual.” 
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and surveillance, including ethical screening at entry, and job security measures 
that would reduce pressures on employees.25 Based on interviews with Swiss and 
Austrian white-collar criminals convicted for fraud, corruption, bribery, 
embezzlement or misappropriation of funds, Schuchter also recommends 
developing and maintaining effective internal and external control.26 Sentenced 
persons (senior executives, CEOs and owners of large enterprises) saw some gaps 
in the internal control system and judged it as an “invitation to act.” Moreover, 
long-term trust relationships between external auditors and convicted managers 
made revisions and other inspections less contentious.  
While top-down, prescriptive approaches to corruption management have failed to 
produce significant results despite two decades of high-profile international and 
national anti-corruption campaigns, most theoretical models have not been 
empirically tested. We see the way forward in developing contingency-based models 
and integrating data on specific practices and strategies to mitigate them. A 
combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, using existing theoretical 
frameworks on corruption mitigation and effective leadership, with hands-on 
analysis and training, will bring corporate leaders to the forefront in the fight 
against corruption.  
Corruption Management: Strategic Approaches  
Our study has provided some insights into how executives who subscribe to 
corruption management employ mitigation strategies and choose instruments to 
achieve their goals effectively. The study identifies at least two distinct approaches 
to agenda-setting. The first can be seen as universal, and is associated with the 
top-down introduction of best practices world-wide. Codes of practice and ethical 
guidelines are most common in this respect and are implemented irrespective of 
companies’ specific corruption risks. The actions of executives are often driven by 
changes in national legislation, policies advocated by international organizations 
and national governments, corporate benchmarking, pressure from headquarters, 
                                                   
25 W. Steve Albrecht, Conan C. Albrecht and Chad O. Albrecht, “Fraud and Corporate Executives: Agency, 
Stewardship and Broken Trust,” Journal of Forensic Accounting 5.1 (2004): 109-130. 
26 Alexander Schuchter, Perspektiven verurteilter Wirtschaftsstraftäte: Gründe ihrer Handlungen und Prävention in 
Unternehmen (Gabler, 2012). 
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etc. One participant at an executive workshop explained: “We went to a training 
session organized by our British shareholder and heard about some interesting 
anti-corruption instruments. We became quite excited and implemented them back 
home, only to realize that that they neither fitted our context, nor produced any 
impact.”  
The second uses a bottom-up approach for tackling the specific corruption risks 
associated with informal practices when these are widespread in the company, that 
is, with a concrete set of objectives in mind. One of the interviewed CEOs framed it 
as follows: “We spend hundreds of millions on IT and I know that we suffer from 
kickbacks received by our purchasing managers from vendors. I want to fight this 
so I have set three goals: reduction of our IT-related costs by 10 percent next year; 
a review of the list of our IT vendors in order to get rid of companies affiliated with 
our managers in some way, and uncovering a few cases of kickbacks and making 
them public.” A combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches would 
constitute best practice. However, we found that in the majority of cases executives 
either do not try or, if they do try, struggle, to identify a short-list of damaging 
practices. We propose a simple yet comprehensive five-step approach to identifying 
targets of anticorruption strategies.  
First, the development of a comprehensive list of practices using in-depth 
interviews with executives and the content analysis of business publications in the 
national and regional media. It is essential to keep the original formulation of 
practices while verifying the list against existing classifications.27  
Second, experts with deep company knowledge (senior executives and business 
unit managers) should be invited to add to the list of practices, especially where 
these are specific for their own company. It would be practical to keep the list 
manageable so that it can be converted into a simple-to-answer questionnaire. Any 
omission may lead to failure to identify some of the most widespread practices and 
those that are taken for granted.  
                                                   
27 See, e.g., Transparency International, “Corruption in the U.K.: Overview and Policy Recommendations, Parts 
1-3,” June 2011, http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/publications/81-corruption-in-the-uk--overview-&-
policy-recommendations, and Transparency International, “Corruption: A Beginner’s Guide,” December 2012, 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/publications/10-publications/454-corruption-a-beginners-guide-
what-is-corruption. 
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Third, once the final list is determined, company employees would be asked to 
assess whether, in their experience, these practices occur systematically, 
occasionally, or never. Anonymity of respondents must be assured. A large random 
sample of firms’ employees at all levels of the hierarchy is recommended. From the 
respondents’ point of view, it would be best if the questionnaire was administered 
on-line or by an outside consultant who does not report directly to the 
management. The survey would then produce a list of the informal practices most 
frequently recognized and acknowledged by company employees. This would then 
form a foundation for the development of specific anti-corruption strategies.  
Fourth, the CEO and senior corporate leaders should select a limited number of 
specific practices they want to target, identify specific goals they aim to achieve 
with regard to each of them, and select monitoring instruments. The choice of 
appropriate execution strategies will be discussed in the next section. The 
proposed instrument allows executives to deal with specific corruption risks rather 
than corruption in general, to direct limited resources to important targets, to 
communicate the anti-corruption strategy effectively, and to monitor the change.  
The suggested methodology is not without limitations. It is subject to bias, 
especially when the design of the questionnaire is dominated exclusively by senior 
executives of the organization who have extensive but one-sided knowledge of their 
organization. The number of questions in the survey should remain manageable, 
which implies limited contextualization. Respondents are asked to assess frequency 
of their experience of informal practices, but where they are not directly involved 
with the practice, they will inevitably report their perceptions. Although there is 
normally a perception bias in corruption studies—personal experience of 
involvement with corruption is reported by far fewer respondents than the 
omnipresent nature of corruption in general—it is likely to be compensated for by 
the tendency of respondents to save “corporate face” and to report on a need-to-
know basis in the context of the in-house study of the firm. Our coaching and 
teaching experience shows, however, that the recognition effect of informal 
practices (when things are named in a familiar way), contextualized design of the 
questionnaire, large size and diversity of the sample, as well as the genuine 
willingness of senior executives to target corruption at company level, ensures the 
success of the exercise. 
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Corruption Management Strategies at the Company 
Level 
Our research into the specific approaches to corruption mitigation adopted by 
companies operating in Russia confirmed the relevance of Lange’s model of 
organizational controls. Executives who subscribe to the management of corruption 
adopt two distinct types of strategies when dealing with it—control and 
prevention—and use two distinct transmitting channels for their actions—
organizational hierarchies and personal networks.  
In the control mode, managers deal with informal practices reactively after these 
practices have already taken place and damaged the business. For example, the 
CEO of an oil company publicly fired a successful regional manager for selling 
gasoline to an informally affiliated company at a lower price. In the prevention 
mode, executives deal with risks which might hurt the business if they occur in the 
future and proactively look out for practices that may be indicative of those risks. 
For example, the CEO of a mining company issued an executive order prohibiting 
sales managers from sponsoring foreign trips for government officials.  
Hierarchical or formal strategies imply the use of such institutional instruments as 
executive orders and procedures, codes of conducts, incentive systems, etc. 
Network-based or informal tools are unwritten, and are spread through unofficial 
channels such as personal networks, informal agendas, informal signals, and 
informal incentives.28 
Our interviewees point out that in addition to formal policies, it is crucial to 
communicate the leadership’s degree of commitment informally. Informal 
incentives and signals can be very effective in mitigating corruption risks and 
preventing specific informal practices. One CEO gave us an example of an informal 
back-up of formally announced policies. He set an example for his regional 
directors and declared a personal commitment to fight conflicts of interest among 
managers working with informally affiliated vendors and suppliers. He sent a strong 
signal through his company-wide informal network that he would not tolerate any 
divergence from the new party line, no matter how close his relationships with a 
                                                   
28 Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise. 
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particular manager had been in the past. According to him, that informal warning 
had a stronger educational impact than all formal policies and procedures 
developed to tackle the issue. The combination of two modes and two types of 
transmitting channels discussed above creates four ideal types of corruption 
management at company level, as presented in Table 4. 
Types of Corruption 
Management  
Control Prevention  
Formal channels  
(hierarchical, official, 
written, codified) 
Reactive management 
through formal channels (1) 
Proactive management 
through formal channels 
(3) 
Informal channels 
(network-based, unofficial, 
unwritten, non-codified) 
Reactive management 
through informal channels (2) 
Proactive management 
through informal 
channels (4) 
Table 4: Types of corruption management at the firm level 
 
The four types are ideal types. Thus, in the example above, the CEO has applied 
proactive management through informal channels, yet he has also targeted 
widespread practices of conflict of interest, indicating that his actions may have 
been reactive. Below, we illustrate the ideal types with examples. 
1. Reactive/formal. An internal audit investigation of acquisition of assets in a 
new region results in identifying a conflict of interest on the part of the 
responsible manager. The CEO fires the manager for abuse of corporate 
office. 
2. Reactive/informal. With the help of the founder-CEO’s network, a bank 
employee caught stealing $200,000 from a bank client is not only sacked, 
but a criminal case against him is opened and a five-year sentence handed 
down. Reactive in one case, the sentence is a powerful deterrent for other 
employees. 
3. Proactive/formal. Rotating membership in a tender committee every two 
years as a matter of policy prevents long-term informal affiliations of its 
members, bias in decisions, and inflated contracts for affiliated vendors and 
suppliers of large oil and gas companies. 
4. Proactive/informal. Before introducing a new policy with regard to 
purchasing managers’ expenses, a Russian energy company CEO attends a 
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number of meetings with them and discusses the proposed policy off the 
record. These meetings allow the managers to share concerns, raise 
important questions, and create awareness, and gives them a chance to 
adjust their routines in advance of publication of the formal policy.  
None of the described types of strategies is superior in delivering effective 
management of corruption. The choice is dependent on such contingencies as the 
nature and prioritization of specific corruption risks, the initiators, beneficiaries 
and cost bearers, the resources available to the CEO, and the corporate culture of 
the firm. CEOs of companies operating in an endemically corrupt environment need 
to master all four types and to develop the largest possible arsenal of anti-
corruption strategies.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, let us return to what we consider an effective approach to managing 
corruption in endemically corrupt environments such as in Russia. Action points for 
CEOs and other senior business leaders may be summed up as follows: 
Make corruption management one of the CEO’s top priorities. Start by recognizing 
corruption as a major risk for the company and its stakeholders, and overcome 
blind spots and lack of recognition with regard to corruption risks. Channel the 
priority status of the anti-corruption management through both the organizational 
hierarchy and informal networks. 
Use a bottom-up, ethnographic approach to identify specific practices that are 
particularly problematic. Spend time and other resources investigating which 
specific informal practices inflict the most systematic damage on the corporation. 
Slice the corruption “elephant” into smaller pieces that can be more easily tackled 
in endemically corrupt environments. Once identified, target these specific 
practices, not corruption in general.  
Combine formal tools and informal influence. Effective anti-corruption strategies 
are based both on formal tools (such as hotlines, codes of conduct, open tender 
competition and standard policies and procedures) and informal influence (role 
modeling, peer pressure and other instruments of informal governance).  
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Provide training to give people the skills to identify, articulate, measure and 
manage corrupt practices. Most CEOs mitigating the risks of business corruption in 
Russian companies agree that making key employees at every level of the 
organization active participants in the anti-corruption strategy is critical for its 
success. Conducting detailed surveys on informal practices and providing a 
platform for discussion of the corruption elephant-in-the-room is an important 
addition to anti-corruption legal training and integrity education.  
A leader’s will to control the risks associated with corruption, to go beyond general 
programs of anti-corruption awareness, and to offer specific skills to identify, 
articulate, measure and manage corrupt practices can and does work in 
endemically corrupt environments. The successful and effective implementation of 
these approaches depends not only on the leader’s engagement and attitudes 
towards this important issue, but also on the framework of the industry in which 
they work.  
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